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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONTEMPT CONVICTION FOR
OUT-OF-COURT PHOTOGRAPHY
In view of public animosity against the accused in a rape
trial, the judge issued an order prohibiting any photographing
of the accused while he was in jail preceding his arraignment, or
on the way to or from the courtroom for arraignment. In the
face of this order, appellants, television photographers, took pic-
tures of the accused a short distance from the courtroom en-
trance as he was being brought from the jail to the courtroom.
These films were not actually used. Appellants were convicted of
contempt. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, held, af-
firmed. The court order was a reasonable exercise of the judge's
power to control activities in and around the courtroom. Brun-
field v. State, 108 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1959).
The extent to which legislatures and courts may restrict the
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and of the press1
has been a fertile field of controversy. The United States Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to uphold restrictions of these
liberties, and has stated that the restriction must be warranted
by a substantive evil the danger of which is "clear and present."2
This "clear and present danger" test has been applied as a limita-
tion on the power of courts to restrain press comment on pend-
1. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First applicable to the states. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press is protected by Amendment
XIV); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (Fourteenth Amendment protects
freedom of speech from state restriction).
2. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
During the period between 1787 and the beginning of World War I, there was
virtually no litigation concerning the First Amendment, which served as little
more than a historical reminder of the lively concern for personal freedom ex-
pressed during the formative years of the nation. Then in 1917 and 1918 Congress
passed two laws- the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Law of 1918-
which resulted in extensive litigation. Schenck v. United States, supra, upheld the
Espionage Act as applied to anti-conscription circulars; in that case Mr. Justice
Holmes laid down the famous "clear and present danger" rule quoted above.
The "clear and present danger" test was not immediately adopted by the Court.
During the next twenty years Mr. Justices Holmes and Brandeis filed numerous
opinions, often in dissent, urging the applicability of this test, but a majority of
the court did not accept this test until the case of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). From that time on, the formula has been fairly consistently applied
[694]
1959] NOTES
ing litigation.3 In three cases involving newspaper comment on
matters pending in court the Supreme Court reversed contempt
convictions, 4 holding that although the out-of-court publications
were directed toward influencing the decisions, they did not con-
stitute a danger to the administration of justice which was "clear
and present." It is difficult to enunciate a clear-cut statement
of exactly what constitutes a "clear and present danger."5 It
would appear that the danger presented by press comment on
pending litigation to the defendant's rights to a fair and impar-
tial trial must be "extremely serious" and its "degree of immi-
in the area of the First Amendment freedoms. However, there has been some
erosion of the test in the field of subversive activities. In Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court, in sustaining the conviction of eleven Communist
leaders under the Smith Act, adopted the following statement from Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in the same case in the court of appeals: "In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510.
On the basis of the Dennis case, the clear and present danger test will prob-
ably never be successfully invoked on behalf of persons charged with conspiring
to incite unlawful anti-governmental activities. However, the test is still pre-
sumably to be applied in other First Amendment questions. Clearly, on the basis
of Bridges v. United States, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), it applies to cases involving
press comment on pending litigation.
3. Graham v. Jones, 200 La. 137, 7 So.2d 688 (1942) (editorials attacking
Supreme Court judgment pending application for rehearing held not a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice) ; Bates v. State, 210 Ark. 652,
197 S.W.2d 45 (1946) (editorial comment on pending litigation did not constitute
a clear and present danger) ; People v. Goss, 10 Ill.2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385 (1957)
(television announcer's statements concerning veracity and credibility of witnesses
in pending child custody proceedings held sufficiently prejudicial to constitute a
clear and present danger) ; Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67
A.2d 497 (1946) (radio broadcast concerning Negro held in custody for murder
of eleven-year-old white girl did not constitute a clear and present danger to his
rights to a fair trial).
4. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (unfair reporting of events in a case
and editorial attack on trial judge) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
(editorial attack on trial court actions in non-jury proceedings) ; Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (editorial comment on pending cases and newspaper
threat to cause labor strike in event of enforcement of court decree).
For a case upholding a contempt conviction for an out-of-court publication see
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1917), where a United
States statute providing that the power to punish contempts shall not extend to
any case except the misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice was therein construed to
extend the contempt punishment to acts having a "reasonable tendency" to "ob-
struct the administration of justice." This case was overruled in Nye v. United
States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), which held that "so near thereto" is to be construed
geographically, not causally.
5. In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed said
that the clear and present danger test had the "vice of uncertainty." In Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941), the Court, after quoting the clear and pres-
ent danger rule as it appeared in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
stated: "We recognize that this statement, however helpful, does not comprehend
the whole problem." And Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927), said: "This Court has not yet fixed the standard
'by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the dan-
ger may be and yet be deemed present."
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nence extremely high" before the comment can be restrained.6
On the other hand, in cases involving judicial control of the order
and decorum of the court, the stringent "clear and present dan-
ger" test has not been applied ;7 in these cases the court may re-
strain any conduct tending to detract from the dignity of the
court and from the orderly administration of justice.8 Excluding
certain portions of the public from trials, generally in the inter-
est of public morals in cases involving salacious testimony, has
been upheld as a reasonable exercise of the court's discretion in
the control of matters in and around the physical confines of the
courtroom.9 Courts have ordinarily not been allowed to exclude
reporters from judicial proceedings, 10 but in-court photography
is almost uniformly banned." The power of courts to prohibit
6. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941), Mr. Justice Black, de-
livering the opinion of the Court, stated: "What finally emerges from the 'clear
and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utter-
ances can be punished."
7. Both state and federal courts have the power to protect themselves from
disturbance or disorder in the courtroom by use of contempt proceedings, and that
power cannot be challenged as conflicting with constitutionally secured guarantees
of liberty. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
8. The power to punish for contempt, which is the chief means by which courts
control conduct in and around the courtroom, is inherent in all courts. Michaelson
v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924). This power is a necessary incident to the
exercise of judicial power, its existence being essential to the preservation of order
in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of obedience to writs, orders, and man-
dates, and consequently to the due administration of justice. State v. Magee Pub-
lishing Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924). A judge may punish any act done
in the presence of the court which disrupts proceedings, all acts calculated to
impede or embarrass the court being construed to be within the presence of the
court. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 334 S.W. 468 (1921). A federal statute
allows punishment for misbehavior of any person in the court's presence or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. 62 STAT. 701 (1945), 18
U.S.C. § 401 (1952).
9. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) (immature persons ex-
cluded from trial involving obscene matter) ; Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86
S.W.2d 931 (1935) (courtroom cleared to enable an emotionally disturbed witness
to testify) ; United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954)
(general public and press excluded from large portion of trial on ground that pub-
lic decency compelled the exclusion).
10. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) (order excluding pub-
lic and press from trial held invalid on its face) ; Scripps v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App.
157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955) (writ of prohibition may be granted to restrain trialjudge from excluding newsmen from criminal trial). Contra, United Press Ass'n
v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
11. Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion: "Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the courtroom during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions and broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated
to distract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in
giving his testimony, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect
thereto in the minds of the public and should not be permitted." This canon was
written into the statutes of fourteen states, and became the basis for an amend-
ment to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule reads:
"The taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial pro-
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photography in the immediate vicinity of the courtroom has also
been upheld.' 2
The court in the instant case was fully cognizant of the rule
that restraints upon publication must be subjected to the "clear
and present danger" test.18 However, it declined to pitch its
opinion on that plane, stating that the order was not directed
against publication at all, 14 but was instead a simple exercise of
the court's power to control activities in and around the court-
room during judicial proceedings ;15 that as long as the measures
ceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall
not be permitted 'by the court."
The question of whether to admit photographers to court proceedings is by no
means a closed one. There has been substantial agitation for a revision of Canon
35. E.g., In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1955). The
attitude toward courtroom photography which Canon 35 evinces was brought about
by the newspaper practices of the 20's and 30's, which through abuse of their
traditional freedom transformed the famous Hauptmann case, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180
Atl. 809 (1935) (trial of the kidnapper of the Lindbergh child) into a veritable
circus. According to a special study of the Hauptmann trial conducted by Oscar
Hallam, former Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, that case is illustrative
of almost every conceivable abuse of freedom of the press. Hallam, Some Object
Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials. 24 MINN. L. REV. 453 (1940). Those
who favor relaxing the traditional restraints against photographers point to mod-
ern-day photographic techniques, which have permitted photographers to take pic-
tures without the judge even being aware of it. E.g., In re Mack, 286 Pa. 251,
126 A.2d 679 (1955). It is argued that a camera in the hands of discreet and
discerning press photographers could be a powerful weapon for the furtherance
of justice and the enlightenment of the public. Brownell, Press Photographers and
the Courtroom - Canon Thirty-five and Freedom of the Press, 35 NEB. L. REV. 1
(1955).
For additional discussions on Canon 35, see, con: Brucker, Fair Trial and Free
Press, 29 CoNN. B.J. 428 (1955) ; Howard, A Newspaper Editor Looks at Canon
85, 37 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 166 (1954) ; Miller, Should Canon 35 Be Amended? A
Question of Fair Trial and Free Information, 42 A.B.A.J. 834 (1956).
Pro: Otterbourgh, Fair Trial and a Free Press, 20 CONN. B.J. 423 (1955)
Holtzoff, The Relation Between the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right of Free-
dom of the Press, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369 (1950) ; McCoy, The Judge and Court-
room Publicity, 37 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 167 (1954).
Cases involving applications of rules against courtroom photography include
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958) (Penn-
sylvania county court rules prohibiting photography in and around the courtroom
upheld) ; Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312 (1927) (photographer con-
victed of contempt for taking pictures immediately outside courtroom door in con-
travention of court order) ; In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp. 615 (1931)
(photographing prisoners in corridor approximately 100 feet from courtroom en-
trance contrary to judge's instructions constituted a disturbance of the court -
was contempt) ; State v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio App. 1954) (photographer
convicted of contempt for taking pictures at court hearing in violation of court
order) ; In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957)
(another application of the Pennsylvania county court rules).
12. See cases note 11 supra.
13. After a reference to Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), and
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), the court said: "These cases construe
applicable constitutional prohibitions to impose the 'clear and present danger'
test as a condition or limitation of a court's power to restrain or penalize free
comment." Brumfield v. State, 108 So.2d 33, 35-36 (Fla. 1959).
14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 36: "A court is [not] governed by the same rules in restricting ac-
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taken appeared to be reasonably necessary to prevent conduct
which would tend to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice, they were justified.16 Further, according to the court,
such measures may not only be directed against breaches of
physical decorum, but may be aimed toward any evil deemed like-
ly to obstruct justice, including disadvantageous pre-trial pub-
licity.17 In other words, despite the fact that in past decisions the
principal justification for excluding photography from the court-
room has been the supposed tendency of picture-taking to dimin-
ish the dignity and decorum of the court, it seems as though the
court in the instant case is upholding an exclusion of photog-
raphy in order to lessen the possibility of the defendant's rights
to a fair and impartial trial' being abridged by adverse pub-
licity.
There is apparently no case holding that photography may be
excluded from judicial proceedings in order to insure that the
defendant not be prejudiced by the added publicity that pictures
would afford. 19 This consideration may have been instrumental
in producing many such rulings, but the courts have not gone so
far as to make an express statement of the proposition. It would
seem, however, that the court in the instant case has come very
cess to its own proceedings (or penalizing a direct violation of such restrictions)
as in restraining or penalizing independent conduct of third parties. The safeguard
against an abusive judicial 'censorship' of its proceedings by such means is the
same as that which controls all judicial action in this direction; the requirement
that such measures must appear to be necessary to a fair trial."
16. Ibid. : "The usual rule [is that] ...a court, pursuant to its duty to main-
tain an orderly system of justice and to conduct all proceedings in a manner which
accords due process of law to the parties before it, may restrain or penalize con-
duct reasonably calculated to obstruct those ends."
17. Id. at 37: "The record before us is ample to sustain a finding of proper
relationship between the order of the court and its duty to maintain order and
decorum and accord due process to parties before it in a case attended by such
notoriety and emotional distress, demonstrated by the volume of attention by the
press. . . .That such extensive publicity can adversely affect the rights of a de-
fendant to a fair trial is no longer debatable." (Emphasis added.)
18. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speech
and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The denial
of a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by this amendment is also a denial of
"due process of law" demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Baker v. Hudspeth,
129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942), rehearing de-
nied, 317 U.S. 711 (1942).
19. There have been several cases upholding court orders against photography,
but none of the holdings was based on the proposition that photography may be
excluded from judicial proceedings in order to insure that the defendant's rights
to a fair and impartial trial be in no way abridged. In Tribune Review Publishing
Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958), the holding was based on the ac-
cused's right to have his privacy reasonably inviolate, and on the necessity for
the orderly administration of justice. In the case of In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251,
126 A.2d 670 (1957), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957), court rules prohibiting
photography were upheld as reasonably related to the maintenance of dignity and
decorum in the court. In State v. Clifford, 118 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio App. 1954),
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close to doing so. It is proposed by the court that the adverse
effects of pre-trial publicity upon the rights of the accused pose
an adequate justification for excluding photography from the
court, but that since this exclusion does not amount to a restraint
upon publication,20 the dangers involved need not be "clear and
present."'21 Yet it would appear that prohibiting photography at
court proceedings will fairly effectively curtail any pictures of
the proceedings being published. In the light of the fact that the
court in the instant case admitted that such photography as was
contemplated would not cause "inordinate disturbance or indig-
nities, ' 22 and that the order was issued for the purpose of cur-
tailing publicity,28 perhaps the better test of the validity of the
order would have been the "clear and present danger" test. If
this is true, then a further question is raised as to whether the
order could have been sustained under that rule. It is by no
means a certainty that it could not; it is at least conceivable that
the adverse effects of the added publicity afforded by photo-
graphs could be deemed a "clear and present danger" to the pro-
cedural rights of the accused. 24 In any event, the court here has
put a case strikingly similar to those in which the "clear and
present danger" rule has been applied. It is true that circum-
venting the constitutional question in this manner will give the
the court rule was upheld as a reasonable exercise of the judge's power to quell
courtroom disturbance. In the case of In re Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y. Supp.
615 (1931), the court order against photography was based on the inordinate
disturbance thereby created. In Ew parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 Atl. 312
(1927), the court's order was upheld as a reasonable measure in order to safe-
guard against unwarranted abuses of the accused's rights of privacy.
20. See note 13 8upra.
21. "None of the cited cases is authority for the proposition, nor does our
search reveal one, which holds that the 'clear and present danger' rule governs a
court's power to restrain, upon occasion, the public character of judicial proceed-
ings or to regulate or place certain limitations on public access to persons in
custody. The requirement has been that such limitations must appear to be rea-
sonably necessary for the orderly administration of justice. The duty of the court
in this respect is not confined to preserving order or decorum in the courtroom
itself, . . . but obviously relates to the entire process from the inception . . . of
official custbdy of the accused." Brumfield v. State, 108 So.2d 33, 37 (Fla.
1959).
22. Id. at 34-35.
23. See note 15 supra.
24. See memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter concerning the denial of cer-
tiorari in the case of Leviton v. United States, 343 U.S. 946 (1952). The question
in that case would have been whether to reverse a conviction because of a trial
by newspaper publicity. Mr. Justice Frankfurter quoted with approval from
Judge Frank's dissent in the lower court, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951) : "I cannot
see the relevance here of cases . . . applying the 'clear and present danger' tests
to contempts by newspapers for articles relative to pending trials (incidentally,
all non-jury trial8). That test has been employed only when the newspaper itself
was threatened with criminal punishment for the publication. It certainly should
not be carried over to a case . . .where convicted defendants may well have been
prejudiced by a newspaper article. In such a case the 'clear and present danger'
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
court more freedom in protecting the rights of the defendant
from unwarranted publicity. However, in view of the traditional
sanctity of the First Amendment liberties, 25 it is doubtful that
such a result is wholly desirable.
David W. Robertson
CRIMINAL LAW - MISCEGENATION - DEFINITION OF
"COHABITATION"
Defendants were convicted of miscegenation. The indictment,
tracing the language of Article 79 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code,' charged that defendants did habitually cohabit with each
other, he being of the Negro race and she being of the white race.
The trial judge in charging the jury defined cohabitation as access
for the purpose of sexual intercourse, and defined habitual co-
habitation as access for the purpose of sexual intercourse as a
matter of habit. On appeal, held, reversed. The phrase "habitual
cohabitation" as used in Article 79 means customary or repeated
acts of sexual intercourse. Under the trial court's instruction in
the instant case an accused could be convicted of miscegenation
without any evidence that sexual intercourse had occurred. State
v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233 (La. 1959) .2
test would bar reversals for all but the most flagrantly scurrilous or deceptive
newspaper attacks. Courts . . . have always recognized that printed matter may
be prejudicial enough to require a new trial without evidencing so depraved an
attitude of the publisher as to support a contempt citation." (Emphasis added.)
Language to this effect, it could be argued, is at least a minute indication that the
Supreme Court might see a clear and present danger in newspaper attacks inclined
to prejudice a criminal defendant.
25. "The First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law
'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' It must be taken as a command
of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving
society, will allow." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
1. LA. R.S. 14:79 (1905) : "Miscegenation is the marriage or habitual co-
habitation with knowledge of their difference in race, between a person of the
Caucasian or white race and a person of the colored or negro race.
"Whoever commits the crime of miscegenation shall be imprisoned, with or
without hard labor, for not more than five years."
Louisiana's miscegenation article is somewhat unique in that it combines a
prohibition of intermarriage with a prohibition of "cohabitation." Twenty-six
states prohibit intermarriage between Negroes and Caucasians and attach either
civil or criminal sanctions, but only three other states have the double prohibition
that Louisiana has. Five states besides Louisiana have various prohibitions re-
lating to sex relations between Negroes and Caucasians. Of all these states, only
one besides Louisiana uses the word "cohabit." MURRAY, STATEs' LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR (1951).
2. The court also held in the instant case that Article 79 of the Criminal Code
does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions,
but a discussion of this aspect is without the scope of this note.
